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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MARKETS
Robert L. Knauss*
I.

EEC PROGRESS TOWARD ESTABLISHING
EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKETS

I would like to concentrate on -what we might call the
international aspects of the European securities markets and,
if nothing else, to define a couple of terms. What I want
to do first is to look at the question of integration of
capital markets, and what we mean by that term. Is it really
easier for a French company to raise capital in Belgium than
a company from the United States? Has there been any integration in the Common Market? Do foreign issuers raise capital
on national securities markets in the currency of that market?
I think we have to answer that question, "No." If you will
look at the statistics shown in Table IV of the Appendix,
you will see that in 1966, in all of the EEC countries, aside
from Germany, the only foreign insurers making use of the
national securities markets were international organizations.
For example, in 1967, a total of 14 million dollars was the
only money raised by foreign issue in the Netherlands. I
think that we can say that the situation still is that the
EEC markets are basically national markets. Germany is somewhat of a special case. Table IV contains statistics on
Germany and Switzerland. These indicate that foreign issurers
raised in Germany 205 million in 1967, and over 800 million
in 1968. Although these issues were made in Germany in
Deutchmarks, many of these issues should be treated as Eurobond
issues. What once was a relatively easy definition of
a Eurobond has become more complex, as the German situation
shows. You must look factually at each issue to determine
whether it was underwritten and sold only within Germany, or
whether it was sold by an international underwriting syndicate.
Aside from Germany, Switzerland has traditionally been a
source, though somewhat limited, of capital for foreign issuers.
The Swiss Finance Minister has controlled this with a queue
system where you line up and wait your turn, but nevertheless,
the market has been present.
What has happened with the EEC? Why is there not more
integration of capital markets of member countries? Without
any question, the treaty calls for free movement of persons,
services, and capita]. Again, without any question, the
founders of the Common Market anticipated complete unification
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan.

and integration of the capital market. The problem is that
there is an inherent weakness in the Treaty in that economic
policy has been considered to be primarily the interest of
the individual state. Thus at this first stage of development
of the Common Market, a unanimous vote is necessary before
any action can be taken on matters of economic policy. Very
briefly, the structure of the Treaty in Article 67 does provide that member states shall progressively abolish restrictions on the movement of capital. Sections 69 and 70 relate
to exchange controls, and there is the specific provision
that the Commission shall propose to the Council measures
for the progressive coordination of the exchange policies
of member states in respect to the movement of capital between
the states.
There have been two basic directives that provide for
movement of capital in certain designated fields. These
provide among other things for movement of current capital
where there is immediate quid pro quo in return of services
or goods. They also listed separate categories where capital
could pass freely, including direct investments, real property
investments, certain other private investments, and certain
transfers of private funds, as in inheritance. For securities, the directives provided for the taking of progressive
steps. The principal one provided that foreign securities
that were listed on a stock exchange of a member country
could be purchased by residents of that country. However,
the ability of a foreign corporate issuer to come into the
country and raise capital was left for further development.
A third directive that is still
in the draft stage
attempts to deal with exchange control problems of new issues.
One of the primary stumbling blocks is that we have a situation
where three of the member countries, France, Italy, and the
Netherlands, still have exchange controls and the other
three basically have removed them. In this third directive
there are provisions to remove all restrictions over the
new issue of foreign securities. As you might suspect,
Belgium, West Germany, and Luxembourg are reluctant to agree
to this, because then they fear that if restrictions are
removed the other three countries will fall back on their
exchange control limitations. The current proposals which
are still being negotiated, would eliminate all restrictions
up to a certain percentage of the domestic securities markets.
It provides for the removal of all restrictions and for the
issuance of foreign securities up to 1.5 per cent of the
average of domestic securities issued during 1963 and 1964.
There are in addition provisions to keep raising the levels.
As I said before, steps in this direction require unanimous
agreement.
An important aspect of this. problem is the importance
of the national market to the national government. As
pointed out in Table I, you will see that the total issues
in the various EEC countries is in billions of dollars,

and almost 50 per cent of the capital is raised by the
government itself. The governments are obviously very jealous
of maintaining and protecting this capital market. The
governments want a source of funds at reasonable interest
rates. I think, also, that before we become too critical
about the lack of progress in the EEC, we might reflect
that the three countries that have the most developed securities markets in the world -- the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Japan -- all currently have limitations on

the access of their domestic security markets to outsiders.
These restrictions vary in kind. Some countries are very
specific in saying what permission you need to enter the
market, while others are not as clear. In the United States
and United Kingdom the restriction is financial (interest
equalization tax in the United States, and need to purchase
investment dollars in the United Kingdom).
Some individuals believe that the lack of use of foreign
markets is not all the fault of restrictions within the
countries. The companies in Europe themselves have tended
to be national minded. For example, Volkswagon had been
negotiating for a period of time to raise capital in Belgium
in order to build a plant there. The capital would be used
within Belgium and the indication was that that kind of proposal would be approved without any question, but there has
been reluctance to make stock offerings. One other item
to keep in mind, when we think about how far the European
security markets have to come is that, so far as I know,
there have not been any equity offerings by foreign companies
in any of the EEC markets. There have been two or three
rights offerings by European companies that are very widely
held in the various stock exchanges (for example, Royal
Dutch had a rights offering which enabled current shareholders
to buy shares), but as for straight equity offerings, they
have not occurred.
There are a variety of things that need to be done to
improve the European securities markets. Of these it is
clear that free entry is critical. It is easy to sit back
and compare our situation in the United States, and say
that we have different corporate laws and different Blue
Sky Laws, yet nevertheless we are able to have one capital
market. The key is that in spite of different laws, we
have free entry. If you have free entry, a single state like
California can have a tough Blue Sky Law. What California
is saying is that if any issuer wants to sell securities
in California, it will treat you like any domestic issuer.
California imposes tough restrictions on all companies,
but it does not impose different standards on foreign
corporations. Once you have a concept of free entry you
can live with a certain lack of harmonization in the corporate
laws and local security laws. There are, however, some
areas where greater harmonization of laws is needed. One
of these is mergers. There is great difficulty in

Europe with companies which merge with companies outside
their own domestic areas. Simplification is needed.
II.

EUROBOND MARKETS

We will turn now to the question of Eurobonds. What
are we talking about? A Eurobond is an issue in a national
market but that is denominated in a foreign currency and
is sold through international underwriting syndicates in
several countries. Typically, these are sold either in
dollars or in Deutchmarks. In the first type of Eurobond,
the dollar issues are sold in Belgium, France, and Switzerland,
denominated in dollars and circulated by international
syndicates, brokers, dealers and investment bankers. In
Germany, there are issues in Deutchmrarks that are considered
Eurobonds. If either the market or the currency is reserved
for foreigners, or the situation is such that because of the
interest rates the domestics will not purchase the security,
then the issue should be considered as a Eurobond issue
rather than a domestic issue. In Germany's case, last year
about 800 millio' dollars of Deutchmarks were sold by foreign
issuers in the German market. Approximately 50 per cent
of those were in fact issued by international syndicates
of investment bankers. At least this amount should be
designated as Eurobonds. Those that were issued and underwritten by German bankers and sold only in Germany should
be considered as issues on the national market.
The background of the Eurobond issue can be divided
into two parts. First, the United States market had been
since World War II a very important source of capital for
foreign issuers needing capital. Not all the money came
from the United States, but the mechanism of the New York
market was used. In 1963, because of the interest equalization taxes this source was basically cut off. Foreign
issuers could not effectively use the New York market without forcing the United States investors to pay the 15 per
cent tax. Thus foreign governments and companies were
forced to find other markets for capital. At about the
same time, in connection with the balance of payments problems, our government placed restrictions on American companies from exporting capital. This placed pressure on
these companies to raise capital outside the country. This
combination of factors led to the birth of the Eurobond
market. This has grown astoundingly, particularly in the
last two years.
One part of this that I find of particular significance,
and again I refer to the tables in the Appendix, is the
extent that in the last two years European companies and
not just United States companies have been making use of
the Eurobond market. Eurobonds have become a significant
aspect of European companies' financing. This leads to the
generalization that while attorneys sit and worry about
legal restraints the financial community just does what is

needed to develop an effective financing device to meet
needs. The national European capital markets were not providing necessary access to new capital, so the financial
community developed a new method. A large part of the initial
pressure for development of the Eurobond market came from
the United States balance of payments problem; but I think
that Eurobonds now have a life of their own. The marketing
techniques including the relatively full disclosure in the
prospectus provided initially by American and English investment bankers have been followed in the European offerings.
The United States effectively exported marketing talent.
European investment bankers and European commercial bankers
have taken an active role in many of the recent Eurobond
offerings using similar underwriting agreements and similar
marketing techniques that American underwriters were using
in the initial offerings.
Another development has been that the base of investors
has grown. Initially, Eurobonds were sold to a relatively
small market. There has been an intriguing mystery concerning
ultimate buyers-- Mid-East oil barons, wealthy South Americans,
and others through the Swiss banks, or whom? I think there
is still a lot of money coming from these sources, but
without any question there is now a broader base of purchasers
of Eurobonds in Europe. In part, the interest in the investor
in Europe in the United States equity market is responsible
for this.
The offshore mutual funds, especially the larger ones,
appear to be actively purchasing Eurobonds. Moreover, local
European bankers, who knew nothing of the issues two years
ago, are now considering that type of securities for small
trust accounts.
The Eurobond market is valuable for us to look at in
connection with the European national markets in order to
study their characteristics, and help determine how they
are going to develop. The Eurobond market is basically
unregulated. The regulatory agencies in European countries,
both the Finance Ministers and the agencies that would
exercise some security regulations such as the Commission
bancaire in Belgium, have ignored the issues. They have
done this for two reasons. One is that Eurobonds have not
been denominated in the currency of the national country.
The other is because the national regulatory agencies have
pretended that Eurobonds are really private offerings.
The latter argument is becoming more difficult to justify.
There is extensive marketing that goes into the selling of
Eurobonds. As the market has broadened, selling pressure
is being exerted on individual investors and not just
on large institutional investors.
Eurobond issues have had a relatively high quality of
disclosure. This has been true in the first instance because
of the high quality of companies that have been involved in
the initial offerings. These have been primarily international

companies, many of them listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
that were in the habit of making adequate disclosures.
Many of the early offerings were registered under the 1933
Act. A larger number were listed on the London Stock Exchange,
and I would agree that the pressure of the English investment
banking community has been quite strong in maintaining the
quality of disclosure. Another reason for the good disclosure
was the make up, at least initially of the participants
in the market place. The purchasers have been sophisticated
investors who have been advised by sophisticated professionals.
These men created a pressure to force continued good disclosure.
A third aspect of this Eurobond market, and this one
I think is very significant, is that these bonds have been
sold in Europe. One of the differences between the United
States security market and every market that I have seen
in Europe, including England, is the difference in marketing.
It is so obvious that you do not see the difference until
you have been looking at it for about six months. Securities
in the United States are sold. We have brokerage houses
with hundreds of-branch offices and thousands of account
representatives who are selling securities. There is more
selling going on in England than any other European country,
yet in comparison to the United States, it is small. Up
until a year ago, the maximum number of partners in the
largest brokerage house in the United Kingdom was twenty.
In these houses they might have up to a half dozen individuals
other than the partners who would deal with customers.
There are no branch offices. In Europe the brokerage units
are even smaller. Most purchasers make contact with securities
through banks, and then on their own initiative. The concept
of selling is something that is just not part of that
European market.
There are obviously two sides to the lack of marketing.
One of the representatives in the Commission bancaire
commented about our hot issue market and our Special Study
of the Security Markets that we had a short period of time
ago:. "Well, we might have some problems with our securities
markets, but at least we don't have the problem of selling
frauds and of the hot issue." My response to him was that
like it or not this appears to be the price you have to
pay if you want a good secondary market. I have become
convinced that a significant part of the United States success
in developing an active securities market has been the fact
that securities are actively sold by salesmen. It is because
of the fact that we sell securities in this country that
much of our regulatory pattern including our direct regulation of broker-dealers has developed. This extensive
regulation has not yet become necessary in Europe. But
the need is developing to find ways of handling the new
European phenomenon of mutual fund salesmen. It is expected
that, as selling pressures increase in Eurobonds and other

securities, more extensive regulation will follow.
The last characteristic I would mention about the
Eurobond markets has been the significance of developing
an active secondary trading market. This again was spearheaded by United States underwriting firms who recognized,
more than the European firms, the need to have a good
secondary market if-you are going to have an active primary
market. You may not make much money on your secondary
market, but the fact that there is a market gives the liquidity that will help provide enthusiasm and a base for the later
selling of new issues of securities.
Some of these factors explain why the Eurobond market
has been able to continue unregulated. The nature of the
participants in that market to date is paramount. There
have been good companies involved, professional investors
involved, and professional advisors involved, so you have
somewhat of an equality of bargaining power. Now there may
be many stages where regulation becomes necessary, but I
think clearly one of them is when the participants do not
have approximately equal bargaining power. In securities
regulations this can occur when the individuals to whom
the securities are being sold are not in a position to
force disclosures on their own. It is at this time that
there is the need for regulated disclosure.
III.

INFLUENCE OF SECURITIES REGULATION

One of the things that happens in looking at regulation,
or the lack of regulation, in the European market is that
we Americans tend to try to compare aspect by aspect what
we are doing here with what the Europeans are doing. We
must recognize, as we comment on the differences of these
markets and the differences of selling practices, that there
are many aspects of United States regulation that have no
significance at all in Europe.
There are some areas of comparison, however, and let
me focus on two. The first has to do with the recognition
that good disclosure by issuers acts as a basis for
promoting active securities markets. This can be related
to the Eurobond market as well as the security markets in
the United States. One of the reasons that these markets
have been successful is because there has been good disclosure.
Disclosures create an open and free market and encourage
investors and promote investor confidence. This in turn
increases trading in the secondary trading market as well
as purchases at the time of initial distribution. Improved
liquidity is a direct result. Other forms of regulation
may produce different results. For example, Belgium has
prospectus requirements, but relies on direct regulation
in addition to disclosure as a method of protecting investors.
In Belgium the Commission bancaire requires the company
to submit a separate dossier of information for the Commission's

exclusive use. The extent of public disclosure is limited.
The Commission bancaire frequently demands that a company
make certain internal changes in their corporate structure
before allowing securities to be sold. They will restrict
sales unless they determine whether the security issue is
economically sound. Protections such as preemptive rights,
restrictions against illegal dividend payments, and requirements for maintenance of stated capital are subject to the
Commission bancaire's examination. This emphasis on direct
regulation is as good if not better than the approach that
we use in the United States for protecting investors against
fraud. I question, however, if direct regulation is as
effective as forcing greater disclosures in encouraging
investors on promoting the markets. In contrast I think
you can argue that direct regulation may act as a depressant
on the securities market. This is not to say that in the
United States
we do not have many aspects of direct
regulation, but most of our direct regulation is related
to the trading markets: regulation of broker-dealers,
regulation of manipulation, and regulation of specialists.
We do not use direct regulation in connection with requirements
on an issurer. The ability of the issuer to sell securities
depends primarily on disclosure rather than aspects of
direct regulation.
A related aspect concerns the marketing of securities.
While the extensive selling and marketing of securities
creates problems in the United States, it is important in
creating liquid markets. In most European countries right
now there are prohibitions against advertising, and prohibitions against the broker-dealer making direct contact
with someone who is not already a client. I think these
blanket prohibitions are detrimental to the creation of
viable securities markets. But there needs to be more
of a change here than just changing the law. In talking
to various broker-dealers in England and in Europe it is
evident that it is a change in attitude that is needed as
well as a change in the law. Some of the larger brokerage
houses are marketing to a much greater extent particularly
in respect to Eurobonds, and with institutional clients.
At the other end of the spectrum there is an increased amount
of unregulated high pressure selling of mutual funds. This
suggests that the complete prohibition against advertising
and the uneven restrictions on selling that currently exists
in many of the European countries are unwarranted. An
approach is needed that will recognize the value in advertising,
and marketing, yet control the abuses.
In conclusion, the importance of the Eurobond market
is in two directions. First, it is the beginning of an
integrated European capital market. It cuts across national
boundaries and is providing a new source of capital to
European companies as well as to United States corporations

and foreign governments. Second, the development of the
Eurobond market is providing valuable lessons to the
financial community which will assist in improvement of
the various national security markets.

APPENDIX
Statistics on European Securities Markets
TABLE I -- National Issues E.E.C

Countries

(in billion dollars).

Shares
Government bonds
Corporate bonds
Total E.E.C.

1964

1965

1966

1967

2,88
2,53
4,95
10,36

3,02
3,34
5,31
11,67

2,59
4,02
4,37
10,98

2,24
5,41
5,16
12,81

TABLE II -- Eurobond issues

European Institutions
E.E.C. Corporations
U.S. Corporations
Other OECD countries,
etc.
Totals

(in billion dollars). 1

1964

1965

1966

1967

19682

0,149

0,058
0,147
0,297

0,095
0,171
0,454

0,115
0,414
0,527

0,025
0,390
2,170

0,547
0,696

0,452
0,954

0,376
1,096

0,756
1,812

1,215*
3,950

TABLE III -- Comparison of National Bond Issues with

Eurobond Issues by E.E.C. Corporations
(in billion dollars).

National Issues
Eurobond Issues
Ratio:

1964

1965

1966

1967

4,95
0,149
3%

5,31
0,147
3%

4,37
0,171
4%

5,16
0,414
8%

*OECD Countries and Corporations 0,980; Non-OECD Countries
and Corporation
370; International Organizations 0,015.
1 EUROPEAN INVESTMENT
BANK, ANNUAL REP. (1964-67).
2 The figures of Eurobond-issues
in 1968 are not official
as yet. The figures given are compiled from unofficial
OECD sources; Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., Economist's Dep't,
World Financial Markets, Dec. 27, 1968; and Neue Zdrcher
Zeitung, Dec. 19, 1968, No. 787/3.

TABLE IV -- Foreign Issues in Member Countries

(in million dollars).
A.

1
E.E.C. Countries Without Germany

1964

1965

1966

1967

10

10

21

10

--

15

-

0

--

-

0

0

-

-

-

-

6

25

41

41

-

-

41

-

-

-

24

48

24

24

-

-

24

Belgium:

--European Investment
Bank

--European Coal &
Steel Com.
-- Others

-

(Inter-American
Development Bank)

France:
--European Investment
Bank
--European Coal &
Steel Com.
-- Others

30
....
-

Italy:

--European Investment
Bank

-

24

--European Coal & Steel
Com.
-- Others

-

-

-

-

(Inter-American
Development Bank)

Netherlands:

24

-

-

-

15

29

-

11

-

-

-

-

-

14

-

1

-

-

45

89

99

100

8

45

75

39

37

11

24

41

14

--

--European Investment
Bank

-

-

--European Coal & Steel
Com.

--Others (Netherlands
Antilles)
Luxemburg:

Total foreign issues
E.E.C. Countries
without Germany:

--European Investment
Bank
--European Steel &
Coal Community

1 EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK, ANNUAL REP.

(1964-67).

Table IV contd
1964

1965

1966

1967

33

-

-

--Others
i) borrowers from
-

member countries

ii)

Inter-American
Development
Bank (raised
in Belgium)

iii)

6

-

Netherlands
Antilles (raised
in the
Netherlands)

Totals
B.

-

-

-

14

45

89

99

100

1965

1966

Germany 3
1964

1967

1968

Germany:
249
384
348
205
800*
The figures include DM and optional DM issues. Nonresident issues in Germany between March 1964 and the end
of 1967 are statistically treated as international issues.
TABLE V -- Foreign Issues in Switzerland

(in million

dollars).4
1964

1965

85

75

1966

1967

1968

100

209**

2S7**

*The 1968 figures are not official. The estimated
breakdown is:
Total $ 1.68 billion of foreign issues
$ 800 million (internationally syndicated)
(Eurobond-issues)
$ 800 million (nationally syndicated)
**Includes Eurobond-issues (Swiss tranche) underwritten
by Swiss underwriting syndicates ($ 70 resp. 75 million).
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT, 38th ANNUAL REP. 58
(1968); EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK, ANNUAL REP. (1965-67).
4SWISS CREDIT BANK, THE SWISS ECONOMY IN 1967;
OECD COMM. FOR INVISIBLE TRANSACTIONS, CAPITAL MARKET STUDYSTATISTICAL ANNEX 1967); EEC COMM. REP., THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKET 360 (November, 1966).
GUNTHER BROKER, DIE MARKTE FOR AUSLANDSANLEIHEN IN JAHRE
1967-1968; BANK-BETRIEB, July-August, 1968, at 186. All
figures are rounded and give approximate magnitude only.

